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A Prudent Central Banker
FRANCISCO J. RUGE-MURCIÁ*
This paper studies the role of prudence in modern central banking. To that end, it
relaxes the usual assumption of quadratic preferences and adopts instead an
asymmetric preference specification whereby positive deviations from a target can
be weighted more, or less, severely than negative deviations. It is shown that
prudence with respect to inflation (unemployment) reduces (increases) equilib-
rium inflation. The overall effect depends on the relative magnitude of the prefer-
ence parameters and the conditional variances of inflation and unemployment.
The implications of the model are examined using cross-section data from OECD
countries. [JEL E58, E61]
T
his paper studies the role of prudence in modern central banking. To that
end, it relaxes the usual assumption of quadratic preferences and adopts
instead a specification that is asymmetric around the inflation and unemployment
targets. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more or
less severely than negative deviations. Under quadratic preferences, the loss asso-
ciated with a deviation depends only on its magnitude. In contrast, under asym-
metric preferences both the magnitude and sign of a deviation matter to the central
banker. This more general preference specification has nontrivial implications for
monetary policy and modifies some of the previous conclusions derived under the
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Recherche is gratefully acknowledged.assumption of symmetry. The point is illustrated here in the simplest possible
setup, where the central banker and the public play a one-shot game without
private information.
Relaxing the assumption of quadratic preferences means that certainty equiv-
alence no longer holds. When the central banker attaches a larger loss to positive
than negative inflation deviations from its target, uncertainty raises the expected
marginal cost and induces a prudent behavior on the part of the monetary
authority. Prudence then moderates the inflation bias associated with discretionary
monetary policy. When the central banker attaches a larger loss to positive than
negative unemployment deviations from its target, uncertainty raises the expected
marginal benefit of surprise inflation. In this case, prudence exacerbates the infla-
tion bias associated with discretionary policy. In contrast to the Barro-Gordon
model, the bias arises even if the central banker targets the natural unemployment
rate. In summary, prudence with respect to inflation reduces equilibrium inflation,
while prudence with respect to unemployment increases equilibrium inflation. The
outcome depends on the relative magnitude of the preference parameters and the
conditional variances of inflation and unemployment.
This paper forms part of a growing literature in monetary policy games that
relaxes the usual linear-quadratic framework.1 Although some of the points made
here have been recognized elsewhere in the literature, the reader can benefit from
seeing previous results in a coherent framework and as special cases of more
general models. This paper is closely related to an earlier contribution by Nobay
and Peel (1998), who study optimal commitment and discretion in monetary
policy using the same loss function employed here. This paper extends and
complements their analysis in several directions. First, this paper solves the more
general model with asymmetric preferences on both inflation and unemployment,
and derives conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Second, this paper characterizes and solves numerically the problem of optimal
delegation. Third, instead of using simulations (as Nobay and Peel), this paper
derives the empirical predictions of the model and tests the null hypothesis of
quadratic preferences against the alternative of asymmetric preferences using
cross-section data from OECD countries. 
Other important contributions include Cukierman (2000), Gerlach (2000), and
Orphanides and Wilcox (1996). Cukierman assumes that the central banker cares
about unemployment only when it is above the natural rate. Under this asymmetric
specification of preferences, there is an inflation bias proportional to the proba-
bility of a recession even if the central banker targets the natural unemployment
rate. Although the functional form is different, this result parallels the one reported
below in Section II. This paper shows that Cukierman’s results are robust to the
precise functional form of the central banker’s loss function (provided the unem-
ployment asymmetry is preserved), and constructs an econometric framework to
examine whether his hypothesis is supported by the data. Gerlach assumes that the
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1Early attempts to allow nonquadratic preferences in this type of model are Barro and Gordon (1983a)
and Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), where the loss function in output is linear. For some drawbacks of
this modeling strategy, see Walsh (1998, ch. 8).central banker preferences are quadratic but the output target is nonlinear on the
supply shock. His model predicts that countries subject to more volatile supply
shocks have higher average inflation rates. Gerlach presents preliminary evidence
supporting this hypothesis.
Orphanides and Wilcox (1996) assume a kink in the output component of the
loss function and introduce path dependence by allowing the inflation target to
depend on past inflation. These modifications lead to opportunistic behavior
whereby the central banker reduces inflation when inflation is above/below given
thresholds but waits for favorable shocks inside the thresholds.
I. The Model
Following the literature, the relation between inflation and unemployment is
described by an expectations-augmented Phillips curve:2
(1)
where λ >0 ;u, u
n and π are (respectively) the rates of unemployment, natural
unemployment, and inflation; π
e is the public’s inflation forecast; and
η ~N   (0, σ η
2) is a supply shock. The public is assumed to construct its expecta-
tions rationally:
(2)
where E is the expectations operator and I is the public’s information set.
The central banker affects π through a policy instrument. We can interpret this
instrument as the rate of growth of a monetary aggregate or as a short-term
nominal interest rate. The instrument is imperfect in the sense that in a stochastic
world, it cannot determine inflation completely, as in:
(3)
where f (.) is a monotonic, continuous, and differentiable function, i is the policy
instrument, and ε ~ N (0,σ
2
ε ) is a control error uncorrelated with η . Since there is
πε = ( )+ fi ,
ππ e EI = ( ),
µµ λ ππ η =− − ( )+ ne ,
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2An alternative would be to assume a Neo-Keynesian Phillips curve where output depends on future
expected inflation and output. However, under discretion, the first-order condition of the central banker’s
problem is exactly the same as the one obtained using a Lucas-type supply curve. The reason is that, under
discretion, the public’s expectations are taken as given and future output and inflation do not depend on
today’s actions (see Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 1999, p. 1672).A PRUDENT CENTRAL BANKER
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no private information in the model, the government’s and central banker’s infor-
mation sets coincide with the public’s and are also given by I. Since i is chosen in
the previous period, i   I.3
The central banker is assumed to have additively separable preferences over
inflation and unemployment. Preferences are described by the function:
(4)
where φ > 0, π * and u* are the targeted rates of inflation and unemployment, and
α, γ  are nonzero preference parameters. The components of (4) are described by
the linex function g(x)=[ e xp (α x)–   α x –1]/α 2 (Varian, 1974). This function has
several important properties. First, it permits different weights for 
positive and negative deviations from the target. For example, in the case where 
α >0 ,positive inflation deviations from the target are weighted more severely
than negative ones in the central banker’s loss function, even if they are of the
same magnitude. This means that both the size and sign of a deviation affect the
central banker’s loss. Second, it relaxes certainty equivalence and allows a
prudence motive on the part of the central banker. Then, moments of higher order
than the mean might play a role in the formulation of monetary policy. Third, it is
analytically tractable and yields a closed-form solution when shocks are normally
distributed. Finally, it nests the quadratic function commonly used in previous
literature as a special case when the preference parameter tends to zero.4 This
result is important because it suggests that the hypothesis that the central banker’s
preferences are quadratic over inflation (unemployment) could be evaluated by
testing whether α (γ ) is significantly different from zero.
The unemployment target is u* = ku
n,w here 0 < k < 1. This specification
accommodates (i) the view that central bankers target the natural unemployment
rate (that is, k = 1, see Blinder, 1998), and (ii) the usual assumption that labor
market distortions make the natural unemployment rate higher than socially
optimal and, consequently, 0 < k < 1. Analytical results obtained under both
assumptions are compared below.
The problem of the central banker is to choose the value of the instrument that
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3In some of the previous literature, it is assumed that the central banker observes the supply shock
before the public does. Consequently, she makes monetary policy conditionally on the supply shock and
an output stabilization bias arises. In this model, the central banker has no informational advantage over
the public.
4To verify this claim, take the limit of g(x) as α →  0 and use L’Hôpital’s rule twice.Francisco J.Ruge-Murciá
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subject to the expectations-augmented Phillips curve and taking π
e as given. The
first-order condition of this problem defines implicitly the central banker’s reac-







u denote (respectively) the conditional variances of infla-
tion and unemployment and are related to the variance of the structural distur-











η . In writing equation (5), I have
used the fact that when shocks are normal, the distributions of inflation and 
unemployment conditional on I are normal. Hence, the distribution of 
exp(α (π – π ∗ )) and exp(γ( u – u*)) are log normal.6
Following the literature, the rational expectations relation (equation 2) is inter-
preted as the public’s reaction function. The Nash equilibrium is the (expected) rate
of inflation where equations (5) and (2) intersect. Conditions for the existence and
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are presented in the following proposition:




u/2) – 1] > 0, there
exists a unique π
e =E ( π |I) such that h(E(π |I),π
e)=0
Proof. To prove existence, construct a
(6)
Plugging (6) into (5) and using π
e = E(π |I) delivers h(E(π |I),π
e)=0. To show
uniqueness, assume there exists a second inflation forecast, say 
π
^e = π *– ασ
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5Strictly speaking, the reaction function relates the policy instrument, i, and π e both of which are
determined in the previous period. In what follows, however, it will be convenient to work with E(π |I)
rather than i. Since these two variables are monotonically related by the function f(.), this approach entails
no loss of generality.
6See the working paper version of this article (Ruge-Murciá, 2001a) for detailed derivations and
proofs. The functional form (equation (4)) is not the only one that would predict that the conditional vari-
ance enters the central banker’s first-order condition. For example, one could assume that higher moments
enter directly in the loss function. In principle, one could distinguish between both specifications if their
first-order conditions are not identical.that also lies on the 45° line on the plane (π
e=E(π |I)) and satisfies h(E(π |I),π
e)=0 .
Replace π
^e in (5) and simplify to obtain




u/2) – 1](exp(α z) – 1)/α = 0




u/2) – 1) > 0 and α≠0 , then it must be
the case that z =0 .
II. Theoretical Implications, Special Cases
The Barro-Gordon Model
The Nash equilibrium under asymmetric preferences can be specialized to the one
obtained using a quadratic loss function. Take the limit of equation (6) when 
α,γ  → 0 to obtain
(7)
This equation corresponds to the one originally derived by Barro and Gordon
(1983b, p. 597). In this case the inflation bias, λφ(1 – k)u
n, strictly positive and,
consequently, the realized inflation rate is systematically above π ∗ . In the special
case where the central banker targets the natural unemployment rate (k = 1), the
inflation bias is zero. Then, monetary policy is not temporally inconsistent under
discretion and the theory cannot explain suboptimally high rates of inflation as the
result of the lack of a commitment technology. When 0 < k <1 , quadratic prefer-
ences predict a linear and positive relationship between inflation and the natural
unemployment rate.
We  will see below that asymmetric preferences (i) generate a positive
nonlinear relation between π and u
n, (ii) predict that the conditional variances of
inflation and unemployment help forecast the inflation rate, and (iii) allow either
an inflationary or a deflationary bias depending on the central banker’s preference
parameters.
Asymmetric Inflation Preferences Only
Consider the case where γ → 0 and α → 0. Then, equation (6) becomes:
(7′ )
Depending on the sign of the preference parameter α , inflation is an increasing or
decreasing function of its conditional variance. In the plausible case where α is
EI k u n ππ α σ α αλφ π ( )=− + ( ) +− ( ) ( ) */ / 2 21 1 1 ln .
EI k u n ππ λ φ ( )=+ − ( ) * 1.
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2
π /2 < 0 reduces and could overcome the inflation bias asso-
ciated with discretionary policy. The intuition of this result is straightforward.
When preferences are asymmetric, certainty equivalence no longer holds. When
α >0 ,the marginal cost of deviating from π ∗ is not linear in inflation, but convex.
Then, uncertainty increases the expected marginal cost and induces a prudent
behavior on the part of the central banker. Prudence then moderates and could
eliminate the inflation bias associated with discretionary policy. Asymmetric infla-
tion preferences could explain, for example, why the Bundesbank raises the day-
to-day interest rate when inflation is above its steady-state trend value but barely
responds when it is below (see Clarida and Gertler, 1997), and why financial
markets perceive the Canadian inflation target zone to be asymmetrically
distributed around the official target of 2 percent per year (Ruge-Murciá, 2000).
There are values of α >0   for which realized inflation is below its socially
optimal level. Hence a deflationary (rather than an inflationary) bias could arise in
equilibrium. This means that asymmetric preferences can provide a theoretical
foundation for Stanley Fischer’s observation (Fischer, 1994) that a deflationary
bias can be a possible outcome in the practice of monetary policy.8
Asymmetric Unemployment Preferences Only
Consider the case where α → 0 and γ≠ 0 Then, equation (6) becomes:
(7′′ ) 




u/2) – 1) is always positive, there is a bias whose sign
depends on whether γ   0. In the case where γ >0 ,there is a positive inflation
bias. The inflation bias is increasing on both the natural unemployment rate and
the conditional variance of unemployment. To understand why the bias is propor-
tional to σ
2
u, note that the marginal benefit of surprise inflation is not linear in
unemployment, but convex when γ > 0. Thus, an increase in uncertainty raises
the expected marginal benefit of surprise inflation. The inflation bias is positive,
even if the unemployment target is the natural rate (k = 1, on this see also
Cukierman, 2000). Hence, the view that the inflation bias associated with discre-
tionary policy disappears when the unemployment target is the natural rate (see
McCallum, 1995, 1997) does not seem robust to the generalization of the central
banker preferences. Asymmetric unemployment preferences could explain, for
example, the finding by Dolado, María-Dolores, and Naveira (2000) and Gerlach
(2000) that the U.S. Federal Reserve reacts more strongly, in terms of changes to
the Federal Funds rate, to negative than positive output gaps.
EI k u n
u ππ λ φ γ γ γ σ ( ) =+ ( ) − ( ) + ( )− ( )     */ / exp . 12 1 22
Francisco J.Ruge-Murciá
462
7In principle α,γ   0. However, it seems theoretically more likely that positive deviations from the
inflation and unemployment targets would be more costly to the central banker than negative deviations.
Estimates of the model in Section III do not impose constraints on α and γ . 
8To my knowledge, this result was first reported in Nobay and Peel (1998).A PRUDENT CENTRAL BANKER
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General Case
These results indicate that prudence has two opposite effects on monetary policy
under discretion. Prudence with respect to inflation (α > 0) reduces the inflation
bias. Prudence with respect to unemployment (γ > 0) increases the inflation bias.
The overall effect of prudence on equilibrium inflation is ambiguous. For given
parameters values, the Nash equilibrium is unique (if it exists), but depending on
the values of the preference and model parameters the equilibrium inflation rate
will be different.
Consider the set of parameters values for which optimal monetary policy is an
equilibrium outcome. A government that delegates monetary policy to a “prudent”
central banker would obtain E(π |I)=π * if and only if the preference parameters
(α ,γ ) solve
(7′′′ )
This equation has no closed-form solution, but it can be solved numerically for
given parameter values. In order to develop some intuition, Figure 1 plots 




u = 2. From the discussion above, points below (above) h(α ,γ) = 0
hk u n

















Figure 1. Possible Equilibrium OutcomesFrancisco J.Ruge-Murciá
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correspond to Nash equilibria with an inflation (deflation) bias. Figure 1 also plots
the Nash equilibrium predicted by the Barro-Gordon model and the set of values
(α ,γ ) for which the Nash equilibrium does not exist (see Proposition 1, p. 460).
Recall that the Barro-Gordon model corresponds to the case where (α ,γ ) → (0,0).
Figure 1 indicates that the original inflation-bias result due to Barro and Gordon
(1983b) is only one of the possible outcomes in a more general model with asym-
metric preferences. No claim is made that the parameters used to construct this
graph are realistic, but the basic point is that we cannot rule out a priori other Nash
outcomes where monetary policy is optimal, there is a deflation bias, or there is an
inflation bias that arises from different central bank objectives than in Barro and
Gordon. In this sense, the econometric analysis of time series or cross-section data
might be useful to obtain estimates of the central banker’s preference parameters
and to assess the relative merits of different game-theoretical models.
III. Empirical Analysis
This section reports the results of an exploratory analysis of the model predictions
using data from developed economies during the 1990s. Since the static nature of
the model invites the cross-section analysis of the data, this paper uses observa-
tions from 21 OECD countries. The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.9 The raw data were taken from OECD
Main Economic Indicators. Average inflation was calculated using quarterly CPI
inflation from 1990:1 to 1999:2. The conditional variances of inflation (unem-
ployment) were computed from a regression of the first-difference of quarterly
inflation (unemployment) on four of its lags. For reasons to be made clear below,
I used two samples to compute the conditional variances: 1980:1 to 1989:4 and
1990:1 to 1999:2.
The simple game-theoretical model developed in Section I predicts that the
conditional variances of inflation and unemployment help explain the rate of infla-
tion. Linearize the Nash equilibrium (equation (6)) by means of a first-order
Taylor series expansion and write it in reduced form as:10
(8) πσ σ ζ π jj u j j ab c =+ + + ,, , 22
9The sample excludes the countries that joined the OECD in the mid-1990s, namely the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, and Poland. It also excludes Greece and Turkey, which are typically
considered moderate- to high-inflation countries (see Dornbusch and Fischer, 1991) and where monetary
factors are likely to be nonnegligible. Finally, the sample excludes Iceland because there were many
observations missing for this country in the OECD database. Except for the fact that this study excludes
Greece and Iceland and includes Luxembourg, these are essentially the same countries examined by
Gerlach (1999).
10Given the small number of data points and the identification issue described below, I did not attempt
to estimate the nonlinear model. Since the model is roughly linear (note that equation (6) involves taking
the logarithm of an exponential function), the approximation error is likely to be small.where a = π ∗ + λφ(1  – k)u
n is a positive intercept; b=– α /2 and c = λφγ/2  are
constant coefficients; j=1, 2, ..., 21, indexes the country; π j is the average infla-
tion rate in country j; σ π
2,j and σ u
2,j are the conditional variances of inflation and
unemployment in country j; and ζ j is a country-specific error term. In the absence
of measurement error and heterogeneity, the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
projection of π on σ π
2 and σ u
2 delivers consistent and unbiased estimates of a, b,
and c. Recall that σ π
2 = σ ε
2 and σ u
2 = σ ε
2 + λ
2σ η
2 are model parameters included
in the information set I, and note that ζ  can be interpreted as an average of rational-
expectations forecast errors. It follows that σ π
2 and σ u
2 are uncorrelated with ζ.
From the estimate of b, one could recover an estimate of α as αˆ =– 2 b ˆ. From the
estimate of c, it is not possible to recover an estimate of γ, but the sign of c is infor-
mative about the sign of γ because λ,φ > 0, by assumption. For example, a posi-
tive estimate of c implies γ >0   and is consistent with the idea that the central
banker weights more heavily positive than negative unemployment deviations
from the natural rate.
Consider first the results for all countries in the sample, reported in column (1)
of Table 1. The OLS estimate of b is numerically small and insignificantly
different from zero at standard levels. This result suggests no systematic relation
between the mean and the conditional variance of inflation during the period
considered. An estimate of the (average) asymmetry preference parameter on
inflation for OECD member countries is αˆ = –0.04(0.14). Thus, the null hypoth-
esis of quadratic inflation preferences (α = 0) cannot be rejected at standard levels.
On the other hand, the estimate of c is positive and significantly different from
zero at the 10 percent level. Although the asymmetry preference parameter on
unemployment is not identified, the finding that c >0   supports the view that (on
average) OECD central bankers weight more heavily positive than negative unem-
ployment deviations from their target.
A PRUDENT CENTRAL BANKER
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Table 1. Results of Least–Squares Regressions






Using Data Post-1990 Pre-1990 Post-1990 Pre-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 2.07* 2.11 2.15* 2.17* 2.17* 2.25* 1.97* 2.19*
(0.21) (0.20) (0.33) (0.27) (0.29) (0.25) (0.27) (0.25)
σ
2
π 0.02 0 0.07 0 0.05 0 0.88 0
(0.07) (0.48) (0.09) (0.66)
σ
2
u 6.86† 7.29* 4.53 5.01 6.86* 7.94* 4.72 9.63†
(3.30) (2.97) (4.27) (4.57) (3.02) (3.03) (5.85) (4.86)
R
2 0.21 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.26 0.24 0.49 0.38
Notes: The figures in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The
superscripts * and † denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero at the
5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively, using the exact t distribution.There are at least three difficulties in interpreting the above results. First,
despite similarities in the economies in the sample, there might well be substan-
tial heterogeneity in the natural rate of unemployment and preference parameters
across countries. As it is well known, pooled least-squares estimates can be biased
when the intercepts and slopes are heterogeneous. Second, since the conditional
variances are estimated using inflation and unemployment data, σ u
2 and σ π
2 are
generated regressors. Pagan (1984) and Pagan and Ullah (1988) examine the
implications of generated regressors in estimation and inference. In many cases,
generated regressors can be problematic because they measure with noise the true,
but unobserved, regressor. The problem is that measurement error in σ u
2 and σ π
2
forms part of the residual ζ,  and orthogonality conditions required for the consis-
tency of OLS might not hold. Third, using estimates of σ u
2 and σ π
2 based on the
same sample period as π might lead to biased estimates of the slope parameters if
the inflation distribution is skewed (see Flood and Marion, 2001). If the inflation
distribution is skewed positively (negatively), there will be an upward (downward)
bias. In this case, the problem is that measurement error in π  is correlated with σ u
2
and σ π
2. Hence the OLS estimate of the slope not only reflects the correlation
between (the true) π and the conditional variances, but also includes a term
capturing the correlation between measurement error and the explanatory vari-
ables. The latter term is proportional to the skewness of the independent variable
and is only zero in the special case where π is not skewed.
In order to address the first issue, I examine a subsample that consists of
members of the European Union (EU). Although there might still be substantial
heterogeneity, it can be argued that these countries share a number of labor
market features (e.g., EU work legislation) and have attempted in recent years to
harmonize monetary policy through explicit institutional arrangements like the
Exchange Rate Mechanism and Monetary Union. Hence, the data points could be
regarded as separate realizations of the same data-generating process. Estimates
using this subsample are reported in column (5) in Table 1. Results are essentially
the same as those obtained for the full sample. The estimate of b is not signifi-
cantly different from zero at standard levels. The estimate of the (average) asym-
metry preference parameter on inflation for EU member countries is αˆ only –0.10
(0.18). The null hypothesis of quadratic inflation preferences cannot be rejected.
The estimate of c is positive and significantly different from zero at the 5 percent
level.
The possible bias that could be caused by measurement error in the explanatory
variables could be addressed by using an instrumental variable procedure.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to find instruments for the conditional variances of infla-
tion and unemployment in the cross-section dimension. In preliminary work, I
considered using the conditional variances of energy prices and detrended Solow
residuals as instruments, but they proved weak in the sense that their correlation with
the variables they were meant to instrument for was too low to yield reliable results.
A strategy to address the third issue is to construct estimates of the conditional
variances using pre-1990 data.11 In particular, I use quarterly data from 1980:1 to
Francisco J.Ruge-Murciá
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11This approach was suggested by Bob Flood.1989:4. Provided that measurement error in π is not serially uncorrelated and the
measure of σ u
2 and σ π
2 is perfect, OLS delivers consistent estimates of b and c.
Results are reported in column (3) for the full sample and column (7) for the EU
subsample. Results are similar to the ones previously obtained. The null hypoth-
esis that b =0   cannot be rejected at standard levels. The estimate of c is positive
in both cases but is not statistically different from zero. Since the number of data
points is limited, more precise estimates of c could be obtained if the restriction
that inflation preferences are quadratic (α = 0) is imposed. All specifications were
reestimated and results reported in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) in Table 1.
Estimates are consistent with the ones previously obtained but, as expected, stan-
dard errors are smaller. The null hypothesis c =0   cannot be rejected at the 5
percent level in two cases, at the 10 percent level in one case, and is rejected in
only one case.
In summary, the empirical analysis of the game-theoretical model indicates
that the hypothesis that preferences are quadratic in inflation cannot be rejected.
On the other hand, estimates of the coefficient on σ u
2 are always positive and in
most cases significantly different from zero. Although the preference parameter
cannot be identified, this result is consistent with a positive value of γ meaning that
the (average) central banker attaches a larger loss to positive than negative unem-
ployment deviations from its target. For the reasons discussed below, however,
these empirical results should be interpreted with caution and are best regarded as
exploratory.
IV. Conclusion
This paper presents initial results in a larger research project that examines mone-
tary policy under asymmetric preferences. The relevance of this generalization of
the central banker’s loss function is illustrated here in the simplest possible setup
where the central banker and the public play a one-shot game without private
information. It is shown that although the central banker’s reaction function is
nonlinear on the public’s inflation forecast, there are conditions under which the
Nash equilibrium exists and is unique. More importantly, relaxing certainty equiv-
alence means that uncertainty can induce a prudence motive on the part of the
monetary authority, which has two distinct and contradictory effects on equilib-
rium inflation. Prudence on inflation moderates the incentive to create surprise
inflation, while, in unemployment, prudence increases the expected benefit of
surprise inflation. The overall effect depends on the relative magnitude of the pref-
erence parameters and the conditional variances of inflation and unemployment.
While the empirical results are suggestive of asymmetric unemployment pref-
erences, they are best regarded as exploratory for at least two reasons. First, results
depend very obviously on the estimation procedure and on the countries included
in the sample. Second, although this paper allows for the strategic interaction of
the central banker and the public, equilibrium concepts other than Nash might be
empirically important. Current and future research by the author seeks to address
these observations. For example, Ruge-Murciá (2001b) focuses on inflation
targeting regimes and estimates the central banker preferences parameters for
A PRUDENT CENTRAL BANKER
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Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom using the time series of inflation and
unemployment. Ruge-Murciá (2001c) examines time series data from G-7
economies to test whether an inflation bias could arise even when central bankers
target the natural unemployment rate. Still, given our limited understanding of
central bankers’ behavior and preferences, it is probably premature to dismiss the
notion that prudence can play a role in modern monetary policymaking.
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